As the new year dawns, the United States faces the issue of what to do about North Korea. Although North Korean leaders have denied charges of building facilities to produce deadly microbes and labs that specialize in genetic modification, the discovery that a North Korean defector tested positive for anthrax antibodies has raised fears that Kim Jong Un’s regime is developing lethal biological weapons. So how should the U.S. respond?

As I see it, our country has at least six options and 2018 is likely to be the year we decide what road to take. The options consist of the six Ds: deterrence, defense, deals, destruction, deceit and delay. We faced a similar decision at the height of the Cold War when I was in the middle of the muddle of what to do about the Soviet Union, as I describe in my recently published book, “Death Rays and Delusions.”

During the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan had charged my team with the goal of creating ballistic missile defense. At the time, none of us knew that the Soviet Union had not only aggressive programs in both offensive missiles and missile defense, but also had a very secret manufacturing and deployment program in biological weapons including warheads for their giant SS 18 missile.

While we debated the six Ds, the Soviets pursued strategies for spreading anthrax along with a nuclear strike. I had assumed that we had already made a deal with the Soviets to ban biological weapons, and I only became aware of the biological weapon threat when a letter containing a few grams of anthrax spores arrived at the Hart Senate Office Building.

In 2001, I walked out of a long meeting in the Hart Senate Office building and ran into yellow police tape in the corridors. Waiting police hurriedly ushered me and my colleagues out of the building and informed us that the building had been contaminated by a small envelope containing a few grams of anthrax spores.  Several days later, when I had already returned to Albuquerque, I received a message to get a nasal swab and start an extended treatment of Cipro, which turns one’s tongue black. The treatment was supposed to be effective if started immediately after exposure, but if delayed by a few days, death was certain. Of course, several days had already passed when I received the message. Fortunately, I was not infected but five people died from inhalation and infection. Another 17 became infected but survived. There was wide spread disruption and the cleanup cost was $27 million.

This encounter with biological weapons clearly demonstrated the extent of this danger. I can’t imagine what a surprise attack spreading tons of anthrax spread over our major cities would do. The combination of a biological and nuclear strikes could only have one purpose–to kill us all.

In retrospect, during my time working with the Strategic Defense Initiative, we mostly engaged in delay in decision making, coupled with a certain amount of deception. Right now, the most likely D may not be one the big six. Instead the U.S. may turn to another D… denial.