As the new year dawns, the United States faces the issue of what to do about North Korea. Although North Korean leaders have denied charges of building facilities to produce deadly microbes and labs that specialize in genetic modification, the discovery that a North Korean defector tested positive for anthrax antibodies has raised fears that Kim Jong Un’s regime is developing lethal biological weapons. So how should the U.S. respond?
As I see it, our country has at least six options and 2018 is likely to be the year we decide what road to take. The options consist of the six Ds: deterrence, defense, deals, destruction, deceit and delay. We faced a similar decision at the height of the Cold War when I was in the middle of the muddle of what to do about the Soviet Union, as I describe in my recently published book, “Death Rays and Delusions.”
During the early 1980s, President Ronald Reagan had charged my team with the goal of creating ballistic missile defense. At the time, none of us knew that the Soviet Union had not only aggressive programs in both offensive missiles and missile defense, but also had a very secret manufacturing and deployment program in biological weapons including warheads for their giant SS 18 missile.
While we debated the six Ds, the Soviets pursued strategies for spreading anthrax along with a nuclear strike. I had assumed that we had already made a deal with the Soviets to ban biological weapons, and I only became aware of the biological weapon threat when a letter containing a few grams of anthrax spores arrived at the Hart Senate Office Building.
In 2001, I walked out of a long meeting in the Hart Senate Office building and ran into yellow police tape in the corridors. Waiting police hurriedly ushered me and my colleagues out of the building and informed us that the building had been contaminated by a small envelope containing a few grams of anthrax spores. Several days later, when I had already returned to Albuquerque, I received a message to get a nasal swab and start an extended treatment of Cipro, which turns one’s tongue black. The treatment was supposed to be effective if started immediately after exposure, but if delayed by a few days, death was certain. Of course, several days had already passed when I received the message. Fortunately, I was not infected but five people died from inhalation and infection. Another 17 became infected but survived. There was wide spread disruption and the cleanup cost was $27 million.
This encounter with biological weapons clearly demonstrated the extent of this danger. I can’t imagine what a surprise attack spreading tons of anthrax spread over our major cities would do. The combination of a biological and nuclear strikes could only have one purpose–to kill us all.
In retrospect, during my time working with the Strategic Defense Initiative, we mostly engaged in delay in decision making, coupled with a certain amount of deception. Right now, the most likely D may not be one the big six. Instead the U.S. may turn to another D… denial.
But wait, there is more. The inventor of that magic rope also invented the polygraph that measures the physiological responses of the test subject under questioning.
This polygraph approach is the gold standard of deception detection in most high security institutions, such as the CIA, but what does perspiration or blood pressure have to do with lying? Well, there is a connection if false answers go along with stress.
story about the genius inventor Garin described a weapon with pinpoint, but still incredibly destructive, capability. This prophetic novel not only predated by decades the invention of the laser, but it also quoted Garin’s detractors as claiming, “This invention smells of higher politics.”
launch vehicle Energia. The payload for the launch was the 80 ton Polyus experiment dedicated to the development of a space control laser weapon. Polyus was a giant risk that was characteristic of the Soviet experimental technology philosophy of try it, learn from failures, fix it and try again. The huge gamble had been in the works as a multiyear high power laser program that was already underway but became a crash program in response to Reagan’s SDI initiative. Instead of trying to compete with their own space-based missile defense program, they decided that laser-based space control would be the most logical path to defeat the SDI. Gorbachev knew that even a minimally successful deployment and test would lead to a space weapon race with the United States. He knew that his failing economy and inferior computer and electronics technology would certainly just accelerate the Soviet path to failure. Fortunately Polyus failed to orbit because of a software problem, and a real star war was avoided.
SDI Guy 