Lasso of Truth

A lasso of truth

In my last post I claimed that success in missile defense will depend on the trustworthiness of key people involved in the development of the system software. No problem if everyone involved swears they can be trusted. But how do we know if any individual is really a bad guy who is lying? Bring on Wonder Woman’s lasso of truth, if you believe in comic books.Wonder Woman and lasso But wait, there is more. The inventor of that magic rope also invented the polygraph that measures the physiological responses of the test subject under questioning.

polygraph testThis polygraph approach is the gold standard of deception detection in most high security institutions, such as the CIA, but what does perspiration or blood pressure have to do with lying? Well, there is a connection if false answers go along with stress.

The best liars, however, can be very cool and persuasive if they really believe in their view of reality. The best validation of this is from George Costanza of “Seinfeld.” He stated quite correctly, “If you believe it, it is not a lie.”

Its-not-a-lie-if-you-believe-it-George-Costanza

Given this ability to trick a lie detector, it seems reasonable to keep looking for the magic rope and that may come from the new field of neurosystems engineering, as documented in my course Introduction to Neurosystems Engineering available on iTunes at https://itunes.apple.com/us/itunes-u/introduction-to-neurosystems/id575671935.

It is possible that high spatial and temporal brain images could show indications of “guilty knowledge” that combined with prior knowledge of the subject could lead to a real lie detector. Brain research is progressing rapidly, and some day we might be able to better deal with bad guys working on critical software, but for now, the best approach is the skilled boss who gets to know the employee. Failing that, we must test the defense system extensively, but still be prepared that the hidden bug could get turned on only when the real attack occurs.

hacker

The ultimate missile defense problem

My previous blog posts have focused on lasers, missiles and physical counter measure evaluation. Complicated topics to tackle, however, those are easier to deal with than the fundamental question about making the split second decision to pull the trigger and launch the defense system. The decision would have be made in the unavoidable uncertainties of real war. There are estimates that multiple interceptors would be launched to stop a single attacker, but what if that first attack is a fake? Other analysis suggest a shoot, look, shoot approach to manage the rapidly changing battle or maybe the system is not fully operational or needs to adjust to surprises.

An obvious counter measure to missile defense would be the use of deception and the creation of doubt and confusion. If the attackers can exhaust the defense in an initial salvo, then the real attack could go ahead without any interruption. With the war unfolding in seconds and minutes, much of the process will have to be controlled by computers.

The first step in the attack could also focus on disruption of battle management decision-making software. How can we test that software to determine if it has not already been hacked? Is there a hidden virus ready to be triggered before or during the attack? Ultimately these issues are fundamental, and as I said in my book “Death Rays and Delusions,” software is hard, but at the time I had no idea how vulnerable our information technology would become.

It now appears that even with the most secure hardware and software, the insider, through sloppy procedures or malicious intent, can open the gates to our information systems or insert a virus that would not appear until the moment of attack. So the ultimate success of defense hinges on being able to trust the humans who create and manage the defense software.