When I joined the SDIO in 1984, the president gave us clear instructions to figure out how to share missile defense technology as part of his strategy to eliminate all nuclear weapons. At the same time, we were aware that the Soviets would love to benefit from our investments and we were serious about protecting our secrets. I responded with a proposal to share early warning data–not technology–as part of an agreement preventing any surprise missile launches, and, as I expected, my suggestion was rejected as coming from an engineer. Reagan continued to insist that we share SDI, and he wanted to make a deal with Soviet leadership, but they kept on dying before he could sit down with them. Then came a totally new and revolutionary Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.
In 1985 at the Geneva summit, Gorbachev and Reagan stated, “A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.” This was not just propaganda but a deeply felt conviction on both of their parts.
After the latest dust up over North Korean missile tests had passed, our current secretary of state indicated a willingness to consider negotiations with North Korea. It seems to be unlikely to happen, or even less likely to be productive, but maybe we can learn from the history of the one of the most surprising negotiations in history. During three days of one-on-one arguments, the result was almost an agreement to eliminate all nuclear weapons.
President Reagan went to the Reykjavik summit in the fall of 1986 with a spirit of 
cooperation and a conviction to abolish nuclear weapons. He wanted to move ahead with SDI that he thought was close to deployment, and share SDI with the Soviets. Secretary of State George Schultz, his principal adviser, had recommended that “we trade the sleeves of our vest and make them think they got an overcoat.”
The young and vigorous new leader of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev also wanted to eliminate nuclear weapons, but his military industrial complex wanted to compete not cooperate. He was told that his industry was only five years behind us in missile defense and could catch up if he could slow us down for 10 years. He was more worried about his own SDI that was preparing to launch its giant space laser and was terrified of a space weapon race in the face of his country’s imploding economy. He had been on the job only since March 1985, but his confidence had already been shattered by a rapidly declining situation that left him desperate to make a deal.
SDI Guy 
It’s interesting that, according to this blog and also Ken Adelman’s “Reagan at Reykjavik,” Reagan and Gorbachev both genuinely wanted to eliminate all nuclear weapons. And it’s ironic that Reagan has a reputation in the eyes of many of being a warmonger.
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The historical lesson here regarding North Korea is tenuous. Reagan and Gorbachev understood the threat to civilization posed by nuclear weapons. All Kim-jong Un is concerned about is preserving his dictatorship at any cost. Hopefully the Chinese will use their leverage on the NK economy to keep him under control. However, the Chinese are very happy to see the influence of the USA in the western Pacific diminished while the USA is preoccupied with NK, while they continue to expand their influence in the region.
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In order to change the military investments of North Korea, will require pressure from China. Successful negotiations would demand that the Chinese would want to make a deal. The Reykjavik situation that Gorbachev faced was desperate because of the continuing collapse of the Soviet economy and many of their social institutions. He had to stop his own military industrial complex , run by Oleg Baklanov, and Gorbachev badly needed a deal with Reagan to gain leverage. But Reagan would not go along even though it was to our advantage. Reagan walked away from an opportunity that may never come again. Our leverage with China today is minimal.
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