canary wearing a face mask

Canary ROC curve and architecture

On By gyonas10 Comments

A ROC curve shows the relationship between a sensor’s sensitivity and specificity. If the sensor is sensitive but can’t discriminate a true positive signal from a false signal it is useless. That was the problem I have written about on the subject of mid course missile defense and the problem of discrimination of real targets from decoys. Since we could not find a practical approach to discrimination, we could not make mid course intercept work. We expected the interceptor missile would have a terrible ROC curve if the adversary deployed effective decoys.

Let’s say the problem is to deploy a sensor in a coal mine to protect the miners. Since a canary succumbs to CO before the miners are affected, the canary provides a useful warning. The ROC curve for the canary makes it an excellent sensor to detect a poisonous environment. We could instead find a particularly weak miner and use  the miner as a warning indicator, but waiting to see if miners show some symptoms would not be a reasonable approach. To improve the miner as a sensor, we could try to create a ROC curve for miners based on if they they have CO in their lungs, are pre symptomatic,  slightly sick with a fever,  or just becoming unconscious, but the canary is certainly the preferred approach.

So  would we  use coal miners as sensors and then shut down coal mines if miners die on the job? Instead we could ventilate the coal mines to avoid CO build up and still use the canary, or maybe install a more modern CO sensor and keep the coal mines operating. I admit  coal mines are going away, but the metaphor might be useful.

So I wondered, why we are using people as sensors for detecting virus containing aerosols that are inhaled? The ROC curve for the RNA sensor has not been published, but I suspect its performance depends on when the sample is collected relative to time of the exposure of the person, how well the swab is stuck up somebody’s nose,  and the sensitivity of the analysis. One article claimed the false negative rate was 25%, but no ROC curve was published. An additional sensor such as fever detection could result in excessive false positives. If just a fever detector is used there would be unacceptable false negatives.

If instead, if  we have a closed space, such as an assisted living center, a business, air plane, restaurant, movie theater  or factory,  it could be ventilated with filtered air, sterilized  and an aerosol analysis sensor such as  an optical bio sensor could be used as a detector.

The optical sensor might be extremely sensitive and specific to the virus molecule. Except it does not exist as yet, but it is not impossible….I guess since considerable research is under way.

People would enter the protected environment through a revolving door that has its own aerosol sensor to instantly detect if the person entering has contaminated breath or clothing, and if so, the person would be rejected. This suggestion would require a major architecture redesign approach involving reliance on this as yet unavailable canary.

Liar, liar, pants on fire

On By gyonas5 Comments

The presidential impeachment hearings are a good example of one aspect of human behavior that I studied recently, when I was involved in a science and technology advisory panel. The question we addressed was: What methods can an observer use to determine if a witness; or if there are two opinions, which side; is credible when they give contradictory answers? It would be wonderful if we really had some method as we watch what is going on in Washington.

In the hearings, the Republicans accused the Democrats of “making false allegations.” The Democrats similarly accused the Republicans of “making statements that ranged from incomplete renditions to outright falsehoods.” Trump tweeted that “the Democrats are liars” and a senator called Schiff “the worst liar in politics.”

The purpose of the panel I served on was to determine if there were technical methods to determine if a subject was telling the truth. Our panel determined that the gold standard of deception detection was the polygraph that measured blood pressure, pulse, respiration and skin conductivity while the subject answered a series of questions. What we discovered from interviewing many experts in the field was that the test really determined a psychological stress response that could be characteristic of a guilty answer, or a response from an innocent person who feels intimidated or even no response at all. In other words, the results were not reliable.

There were also examples in the press of use by the CIA on Guantanamo detainees of sleep deprivation and water boarding to elicit confessions, but they were also found to be not useful and deemed a form of torture. Acute stress induced by torture was also found to destroy memory. From our discussions with professional interrogators, the one approach that seemed to work was to have extensive prior knowledge and then intimidate the subject in order to induce a confession. An expert at interrogation knew how to use psychological methods to condition a person to “spill the beans” with no gadgets at all.

So what does this have to do with my supposed knowledge about missile defense? One of the most controversial and contradictory aspects of my more than 50 years of participation in the technical community  was the response to President Reagan’s request in his national security speech March 23, 1983. Reagan asked the “scientific community…to turn their great talents …to give us the means of rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete” … to “intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies.” His speech was the starting point of my several years involved in trying to satisfy his request by first helping to make a plan for, and then participating in, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) as its first Chief Scientist.

Many years later, L. Wood, a primary representative of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories’ proposed X-ray laser program, told science writer J. Hecht, “SDI (AKA Star Wars) was a brilliantly successful bluff…illusion of an awesome technological capability.” Wood said, “I got the results I wanted. The Soviet Union collapsed.”

If there was an intentional hoax, Wood and others sure had me fooled since I was convinced nobody was bluffing. In my opinion, Reagan hated nuclear weapons as much as he hated Soviet Communism, and he believed we could find a way to defend ourselves, that is if we jointly managed a transition to eliminate nukes and then share a defense system. I became convinced that in fact SDI had little impact on the Soviet Union that went bankrupt on their own without our help through their society riddled with deception, mismanagement and moral confusion.

But what about the truth of the SDI? Gorbachev told the Politburo, “Our main goal now is to prevent another new stage in the arms race from taking place. If we do not do that, the danger for us will grow … an arms race that is beyond our strength. We will lose, because now for us that race is already at the limit of our possibilities.” There is no question that Gorbachev was a believer, even though his advisers, such as Evgeny Velikhov, the principal Soviet scientific leader, claimed it was a delusion.

At the same time, Gorbachev’s Military-Industrial Commission advisers told him, “Americans think that a multi echelon missile defense system should allow, at most 0.1 percent of the attacking missiles to get through” and their belief was that the key for missile defense would be “a new type of nuclear weapons consist of transforming part of the energy from a nuclear explosion into powerful streams of directed x-rays or electromagnetic radiation or stream of high energy particles…capable of striking in space or from space ballistic missiles, their warheads, satellites and the targets …at distances of several thousand kilometers.” The advisers added, “Full scale of these weapons is expected to occur in the second half of the 1990s.”

The head of their nuclear programs, Victor Mikhailov, was so convinced that nuclear directed energy was a realistic future possibility that he argued to stop such work that he called the “Evil Jinn.” There was no lack of conviction in the Soviet Union that directed nuclear weapons were critical to the success of the SDI program, even though at the time, Donald Kerr, the head of Los Alamos argued it was an exaggeration, Bud McFarlane, Reagan’s National Security Advisor, said the program was a “sting,” and much latter Reagan’s scientific adviser, Jay Keyworth, even called the work at LLNL “unadulterated lies.”

So what about the lying liars, whether it be in Congress, among scientists, weapons developers and politicians? In my opinion, the best expert on the subject is George Constanza from the television series “Seinfeld.” His memorable quote was, “It is not a lie if you believe it,” and I believe he is right.

Trust me.

How would Sun Tzu deal with drone swarm attacks?

On By gyonas6 Comments

In my last post, I imagined that a potential strategic threat from swarms of drones could be developed from existing technology. I speculated that a cargo ship in a harbor could deliver biological agents or radioactive clouds to large coastal cities. Such an attack would best be prevented through deterrence, but it might be difficult or impossible to determine the attacker. The counter to this strategic threat is certainly knowledge of enemy preparations and real time intelligence. We would need a declared policy in regard to such a strategic attack and we would need to figure out how to convince any adversary that we know more than they know.

A more likely near term threat would be on the theater battlefield where drone swarms could threaten land warfare systems, including armored vehicles. Even a heavily armored tank would e vulnerable to even a small explosive charge if delivered down the barrel of the main gun.

A recent article in the C4ISRNET reported that Russian engineers have proposed a concept called Flock-93 that would employ “hundreds of drones, each armed with an explosive charge” to attack “terrorists and high-tech adversaries.” The application of drones to theater warfare seems to be likely and the counter measures already suggested include “jammers, lasers, high power microwaves” and more speculatively even counter-robot swarms. Can you imagine a future war where the sky over the battlefield is filled with thousands of drones and counter drones?

The battlefield of the future will also be complicated by the dependence on C4ISR and use of attacks against information and surveillance capabilities. But, as the TV infomercials say, “But wait, there’s more.” We already anticipate that space-based sensors and communications will be relied on and will be vulnerable to attack at the earliest stage of a conflict. Even before that, both sides in the conflict will heed the words of Sun Tzu, the 512 BCE Chinese philosopher who wrote in his classic work, “The Art of War,” “All war is based on deception.”

One of my favorite quotes from Sun Tzu is: “To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself.” If the reader is familiar with my book, “Death Rays and Delusions,” you will recall that I believe the Soviet Union provided the mechanism for its own defeat. I quoted a scholar of Soviet history, Vladimir Zubok, who wrote, “The strangest empire in modern history committed suicide.” The noted American historian on the Cold War, John Gaddis, agreed with my claim that the “Soviet Union might have been more interested in confining Soviet testing” than in worries about our testing of our space-based weapons.

So, getting back to Sun Tzu’s response to drone swarm attacks, the key will be to convince the adversary that the future application of such technology will be futile and even self-defeating, so they should not even try. The future is likely to be dominated, as always, by a mind war that I believe has already begun.

A simple, low cost, really nasty new weapon system

On By gyonas8 Comments

Precision drone attack damage of Saudi Oil facility

Could low cost, fairly low tech aircraft defeat the very expensive missile defense system of Saudi Arabia?  Of course not! No way, I thought, since the Saudis rely on our technology and we have spent billions and billions on missile defense since we began the SDI program in 1984.

I never gave this possible threat much thought until the Saudis’ giant oil facility was attacked with high precision on Sept. 14, causing enough damage to measurably reduce the global oil supply.

Yes there was a fairly modern missile defense system in place, but the attack came from tens of small low-flying drones and cruise missiles proving that the best defense against the wrong attack is useless. It looks like I was not the only one surprised since Israel, who should have been the most alert to such threats, has just announced they are reacting to this event. (“Netanyahu seeks billions to fund Israeli defense against Iranian cruise missiles,” Haaretz, Oct. 07, 2019.) Even before that, the Russians announced in Izvestia that their small multi rotor drones “will perform not only reconnaissance missions, but also strike targets with miniature bombs.”

I recall that when the SDI was created, the secretary of state raised the issue of cruise missile defense, but his question was never seriously answered and we focused on the Soviets’ huge investment in intercontinental ballistic missiles. So this new threat is not so new, but I hope the new aspect of swarms of low-cost drones is now being taken seriously.

This wake-up call up call should now be loud and clear, but even worse than we expected, since even though the cost of cruise missiles is very high, the technology and cost of swarms of drones has become very attractive worldwide to even capable individuals. It is now realistic that many of the world’s soft targets, such as cities, are vulnerable to attack. But certainly we could use electromagnetic weapons to jam, confuse, take over or destroy the guidance and communications of drones, high power lasers to destroy their delicate components or just plain old intercept missiles and anti-aircraft guns to blow them out of the sky, so not to worry.  We could even deploy our own swarms of defense drones to attack their offense swarms.

Well, it is not that simple since the real issue is the cost exchange, and the low cost and tactics available to giant swarms of drones could reduce the effectiveness of most of tomorrow’s technologically available defenses.

In addition, there is the element of surprise, demanding an early warning detection and tracking system, as well as the reality of exhaustion of the defense against fake or real repeated attacks. But we know that each low-cost drone could only deliver a pound or so to a target, so what is the big deal? Well, maybe the drones could target critical parts of our exposed electric grid, or maybe disperse biological agents along major streets, or target large sports events with hundreds of grenades or just go after parking lots at crowded shopping centers? The implication of such terror weapons are frightening to say the least.

Certainly Israel has some not so friendly neighbors, and their enemies must be preparing such killer drone swarm attacks, but we don’t have such problems from our neighbors .…  unless the drones are delivered from ships near the big cities near our coasts.

So what to do about all of these new concerns about a threat that might be more likely than intercontinental missile attack that attracted our defense community for decades?  I am sure the Pentagon, the labs and the defense industry are working to figure out our response. Of course, the threat will evolve as well as the defenses, and we need to also prepare for simultaneous info and space attacks, so we may look on the simplicity of the good old days with nostalgia.